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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Joseph L. Madrid appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction,
wherein the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years
fixed, for Mr. Madrid's guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. On appeal,
Mr. Madrid asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At three in the morning, Officer Erickson and Officer Chopko were called to a
convenience store based on a complaint that a "suspicious" person was in the store.
(01/18/12 Tr., p.30, L.15

p.31, L.2.)

Upon entering the store, the officers saw

Mr. Madrid exiting the men's restroom and noticed a pill bottle with a torn prescription
label partially protruding from a pocket on his pants. (01/18/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-8, p.48,
Ls.3-18.) According to officer Chapko, there appeared to be plastic baggies inside the
pill bottle. (01/18/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-13.)
Officer Chapko asked Mr. Madrid to step outside and he was patted down for
weapons, even though Officer Erickson testified that he did not feel threatened and did
not have any reason to believe Mr. Madrid was armed. (01/18/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.20-25,
p.15, Ls.7-9, p.41, L.25 - p.42, L.7.) Officer Chopko then asked Mr. Madrid to sit on a
curb. (01/18/12 Tr., p.22, Ls.20-24, p.28, Ls.9-15.)
After Mr. Madrid sat down, both officers asked Mr. Madrid questions about the pill
bottle. (01/18/12 p. 15, Ls.7-12.) Specifically, Mr. Madrid was asked about the contents
of the bottle and he told the officers that it contained prescription medications.
(01/18/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-14, p.33, L.22

p.34, L.1.) Officer Chopko then asked him
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why he was not carrying his prescriptions in a labeled bottle. (01 /18/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.1116.) Mr. Madrid said that he has approximately ten prescriptions and he keeps them all
in the same bottle.

(01/18/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.17-19.) After the questioning, Mr. Madrid

consented to the seizure of the pill bottle and Officer Erickson took the bottle from him.
(01/18/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.20-23, p.15, Ls.7-14, p.24, Ls.3-8.) Officer Erickson opened the
bottle, noticed the smell of marijuana, and found various controlled substances.
(01/18/12 Tr., p.35, Ls.3-18.) At that point, Mr. Madrid was placed under formal arrest.
(01/18/12 Tr., p.40, Ls.6-17.)

During the course of the foregoing events, Mr. Madrid

was never read, or otherwise provided, Miranda' warnings. (R., p.70.)
Mr. Madrid was charged, by Information, with one felony count of possession of a
controlled substance, two misdemeanor counts of possession of a controlled substance,
and one misdemeanor count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.38-39.) The
State also filed an Information Part II charging Mr. Madrid with a persistent violator
enhancement. (R., pp.54-55.) Mr. Madrid then filed a motion to suppress evidence and
a supporting memorandum, wherein Mr. Madrid argued that he was under the functional
equivalent of arrest when he was asked by the officers to sit on the curb and that the
arresting police officer failed to read Mr. Madrid Miranda warnings prior to custodial
interrogation. (R., pp.63-68.) The district court determined that Mr. Madrid was not in
custody when he was asked incriminating question by the police and, therefore, denied
Mr. Madrid's motion to suppress. (R., pp.88-90.)
Mr. Madrid pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and preserved
the ability to challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal. (R., pp.96-97,
102-103.) In return for Mr. Madrid's plea, the state dismissed the remaining charges
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See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 (1966).
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and the Information Part II.

(04/09/12 Tr., p.

p.

L.4.)

Thereafter, the

district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.
(R., pp.102-105.) Mr. Madrid timely appealed. (R., pp.107-110.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Madrid's motion to suppress because
his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Madrid's Motion To Suppress Because His
Statements Were Obtained In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution
A.

Introduction
Mr. Madrid argues that he was in the functional equivalent of custody when he

was asked to sit on the curb. The officers never read Mr. Madrid Miranda warnings but
asked him incriminating questions about the contents of the pill bottle. As such, any
incriminating statements he made in response to the police officers' questions should be
suppressed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court defers to the trial court's
findings of fact if they were supported by substantial evidence, but will freely review the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. See State v. Atkinson, 128
Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996).

C.

Mr. Madrid Was Under Arrest, Or Its Functional Equivalent, When He Was
Subjected To Interrogation By Officer's Chapko And Erickson
Mr. Madrid argues that he was either under arrest, or its functional equivalent,

when law enforcement asked him to leave the convenient store and sit down on the
curb outside the convenient store. As such, any pre-Miranda incriminating statements
he made in response to law enforcement's questions should have been suppressed by
the district court.

5

"In Miranda, the United States Supreme Couri held that, in order to safeguard the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the police must inform
individuals of certain rights before underiaking a custodial interrogation." State v. Doe,
130 Idaho 811, 815 (Ct. App. 1997). "Statements elicited in violation of this rule may
not be admitted for certain purposes at trial." Id. "However, the obligation to administer
Miranda warnings arises only where there has been such a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him 'in custody."' Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, "Even though a person is not formally
arrested, 'the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a
suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest."'
State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128-29 (2010) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). "The 'custody' test is an objective
one, it is not based on the subjective impressions in the minds of either the defendant or
the law enforcement officer." State v. Massee, 132 Idaho 163, 165 (Ct. App. 1998).
"[TJhe only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would
have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442. In other words, a person is
under the functional equivalent of arrest if a "reasonable man ... would believe that he
was deprived of his freedom of movement in a significant way." State v. Myers, 118
Idaho 608, 611 (Ct. App. 1990).
'To determine whether custody has attached, 'a court must examine all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation."' State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577
(2010) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, (1994)).

"Factors to be

considered by the court include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of
the officer or officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of
6

other persons." State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 436 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "[T]he burden of
showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a failure
to administer Miranda warnings." James, 148 Idaho at 577.
In examining the factors surrounding the interrogation in this matter, it is apparent
that a reasonable person in Mr. Madrid's position would have felt as if she/he was under
arrest when the officers asked him to sit on the curb outside of the convenient store.
Mr. Madrid left the bathroom of the convenience store and was confronted by two police
officers.

(01/18/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.2-8, p.48, Ls.3-18.)

Officers Chapko and Erickson

immediately approached Mr. Madrid as he left the bathroom and "had him" go outside.
(01/18/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.20-25; 07/15/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-23, p.5, Ls.16-17.) According to
Officer Chapko Mr. Madrid was detained "at the moment we made contact with him
inside the store." (07 /15/11 Tr., p.13, Ls. 7-12.) At this point a reasonable person would
conclude that the officers were at the convenient store to investigate him.

This

inference would be drawn by a reasonable person because the officers were obviously
not in the store for their own personal business, as they immediately approached
Mr. Madrid and had him go outside. That situation would have the appearance of less
police domination if Mr. Madrid had exited the bathroom and noticed two police officers
that happened to be in the store shopping.

However, a reasonable person would

probably think that the officers were there waiting for him as they immediately
approached him after he left the bathroom. See Myers, 118 Idaho at 611-612 (holding
that unusual police effort to stop and detain an individual is a factor in determining
whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes).
The weapons frisk also heightened the intimidating nature of the encounter as it
constitutes a significantly more invasive interaction than mere questioning.
7

The first

thing the officers did after escorting Mr. Madrid outside was to pat him down for
weapons even though the officers had no reason to suspect that he was carrying a
weapon and Officer Erickson stated he did not think Mr. Madrid was armed. (01 /18/12
Tr., p. 15, Ls.7-12, p.41, L.25- p.42, L.7; 07/15/11 Tr., p.15, L.24- p.16, L.13.) The
frisk would convey to a reasonable person that the officers were under the impression
that Mr. Madrid was armed and dangerous because a weapons frisk in the context of a
Terry stop, is only warranted if the officers have reason to believe the subject is armed.
See State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 250 (Ct. App. 2003) (reaffirming that a Terry frisk is

legal "if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that would lead a
reasonably prudent person to believe that the individual with whom the officer is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel this belief").
The request for Mr. Madrid to sit down is another factor supporting the conclusion
that he was in custody for Miranda purposes.

After frisking him for weapons, the

officers asked Mr. Madrid to sit on the curb. (01 /18/12 Tr., p.22, Ls.20-24, p.28, Ls.915.) Both officers stood in front of Mr. Madrid while he was sitting. (01 /18/12 Tr., p.32,
Ls.7-13, p.38, Ls.6-16.) The combination of the officer's requesting that Mr. Madrid sit
down, and the fact that they remained standing functioned as two separate displays of
authority which were manipulative tactics which would convey to a reasonable person in
Mr. Madrid's situation that he "was deprived of his freedom of movement in a significant
way." Myers, 118 Idaho at 611.

2

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
8

Additionally, the fact that it was three in the morning and that no one

was

around also enhanced the intimidating nature of this encounter. (01 /18/12 Tr., p.10, L.8
- p.11, L.1.)
The subsequent questioning of Mr. Madrid occurred without Miranda warnings
and was likely to elicit incriminating responses and, therefore, should have been
suppressed. 3 (R., pp. 70.) "[T]he term 'interrogation,' [as used in Miranda,] refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."

Island v. Innis, 446 U.

Rhode

1, 301 (1980). (footnotes omitted). In this case, Mr. Madrid

was asked multiple questions by the officers about the nature and content of the pill
bottle. (01/18/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-14, p.23, L.20-23, p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.2, p.33, L.22 p.34, L.5.) At the trial level, it was assumed that the questions were likely to elicit a
criminal response.

(R., pp.88-90.) Therefore, Mr. Madrid was subjected to custodial

interrogation.
In sum, Mr. Madrid was in custody when he was asked incrimination questions
without having been given the benefit of Miranda warnings. As such, his subsequent

3

In its Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the district court made a factual
finding that the questions concerning the contents of the pill bottle were asked before
However, that
Mr. Madrid was escorted out of the convenience store. (R., p.89.)
factual finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence, as both officers
testified at the suppression hearing that those questions were asked after Mr. Madrid
sat down on the curb outside of the store. (01/18/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-14, p.23, Ls.20-23,
p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.2., p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.22, p.39, Ls.3-15.) "When we review an
order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's factual
findings, unless they are clearly erroneous." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128 (2010).
"Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and
competent evidence." Id. Since the district court's conclusion is not supported by
evidence it is clearly erroneous.
9

statements should be suppressed as they were obtained in violation of his state and
federal rights against compelled self incrimination.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Madrid respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2012.

I

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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